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I made a conscious decision that I didn’t need to stay current every 15 minutes on the issue. I literally did not ask. … I’m assuming he’ll tell me if he’d gotten something we should know.
—U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, explaining why he didn’t ask about the Iraqi WMD hunt during a 30-minute meeting last week with David Kay, a senior leader of the U.S.-led team dedicated to searching for evidence of Iraqi WMD programs.

By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire
VIENNA — The United States today called on the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors to take immediate action to counter Tehran’s alleged efforts to frustrate the agency’s work in Iran, while Iranian envoy Ali Akbar Saleh defended his country’s record and criticized the United States for trying to “politicize” the matter (see GSN, Sept. 8)...Full Story
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appeared to avoid the issue of the U.S. search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq during a five-day visit last week to Iraq and Afghanistan, according to Washington Post (see GSN, Sept. 8)...Full Story
During a parade today celebrating North Korea’s 55th anniversary, the beleaguered country’s army chief said Pyongyang would continue to develop nuclear weapons, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 8)...Full Story
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Tuesday, September 9, 2003 |  | | |  |
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By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A report released by RAND Europe yesterday reiterates warnings that terrorists could use sea cargo containers to transport weapons of mass destruction into the United States or to use as weapons themselves.
“Terrorists could … use containers to transport dangerous materials, weapons, or use the containers themselves as weapons of mass destruction,” says the report, Seacurity: Improving the Security of the Global Sea-Container Shipping System. “The potential threat of terrorists using containers poses a large risk to our economies and our societies,” it says.
The United States has begun two initiatives to help improve cargo container security. Through the Container Security Initiative, the United States has entered into agreements with a number of countries to station inspectors at foreign seaports to search high-risk cargo shipments heading to the United States (see GSN, Aug. 6). Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner announced last month that countries representing 19 of the 20 largest ports in the world have joined the initiative. Under the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program, foreign seaports obligate themselves to seal containers before they arrive in the United States, according to the report (see GSN, July 29).
Even with the increased U.S. efforts, however, several challenges still face international cargo container security, the RAND report says. One of the main challenges is confusion among U.S. and European agencies as to the agencies responsible for managing container security, it says. In the United States, nine agencies have some role in maritime security, but none has received full authority over the issue. In the European Union, there is no single authority responsible for port and maritime security, according to the report.
In addition, the fact that multiple parties are involved in the container supply chain also poses a security risk, the report says. It proposes improvements in logistics-chain integration to reduce the number of parties that handle a cargo container, and in turn, the amount of container seal inspections that would have to be performed. The report also warns of the difficulties in tracing the whereabouts of a given cargo container and in verifying its port of origin, as well as of cost concerns that could dissuade private industry from undertaking security measures.
The report recommends the use of risk analysis software to better determine the likelihood that a cargo container poses a terrorist risk. One such program, Contraffic, has been developed by the European Commission’s Joint Research Center. In addition, the report also recommends the use of more “active” seals on cargo containers and the increased encouragement of companies with a “vested interest” in container security to invest in more sophisticated security measures.
While cargo containers have not generally been the targets of terrorists in the past, the lack of security could make them attractive targets in the future, according Kevin O’ Brien, a RAND Europe senior policy analyst and an author of the report.
“It is generally acknowledged that the terrorists will choose the way of least resistance as well as choosing targets that result in widespread media coverage. This coverage is most likely to be provided through attacks resulting in many casualties,” O’Brien said in a press statement. “Although sea-containers have not been a target in the past compared with air travel, there is no reason why they shouldn’t be targets in the future,” he said.
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U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appeared to avoid the issue of the U.S. search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq during a five-day visit last week to Iraq and Afghanistan, according to Washington Post (see GSN, Sept. 8).
Rumsfeld said he had not asked about progress in the search during a meeting Saturday with David Kay, the CIA representative coordinating the work of the Iraq Survey Group, which is conducting the search.
“I have so many things to do at the Department of Defense," Rumsfeld said. “I made a conscious decision that I didn’t need to stay current every 15 minutes on the issue. I literally did not ask. … I’m assuming he’ll tell me if he’d gotten something we should know,” Rumsfeld said.
The topic of the WMD search also came up during Rumsfeld’s visits with U.S. troops, according to the Post. During one such visit in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, Rumsfeld said that the Iraq Survey group was in charge and that “I have a feeling they will, in fact, continue to work the problem.”
During a final press conference in Baghdad, Rumsfeld was asked twice about possible progress in the search, but refused to answer, the Post reported.
“I’m inclined not to,” Rumsfeld replied to a request for an example of progress in the search. “I’ll tell you what the situation is: The situation is that it’s an important question,” he said (Dana Priest, Washington Post, Sept. 9).
IAEA Discounts Iraqi Nuclear Program
Meanwhile, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohammed ElBaradei has said in a confidential report that Iraq’s nuclear weapons program would have been unable to support an active attempt to develop such weapons, according to the Associated Press.
In his report, which is expected to be reviewed by the IAEA Board of Governors this week during a meeting in Vienna, ElBaradei said U.N. weapons inspectors had found no evidence of an active nuclear weapons program before they withdrew in March.
“In the areas of uranium acquisition, concentration and centrifuge enrichment, extensive field investigation and document analysis revealed no evidence that Iraq had resumed such activities,” the report says. “No indication of post-1991 weaponization activities was uncovered in Iraq,” it says (Associated Press/Newsday, Sept. 9).
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By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire
VIENNA — The United States today called on the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors to take immediate action to counter Tehran’s alleged efforts to frustrate the agency’s work in Iran, while Iranian envoy Ali Akbar Saleh defended his country’s record and criticized the United States for trying to “politicize” the matter (see GSN, Sept. 8).
Amid widespread concern that Iran is seeking to enrich uranium for use in an eventual nuclear weapon, U.S. diplomats are working on the sidelines of the meeting to develop a resolution on Iran to which board members are generally amenable, U.S. Mission spokesman Michael Garuckis said. Board meetings typically last two days but this one appears likely to run into a fourth or even fifth day over the Iran question.
Garuckis said the United States hopes to introduce a resolution tomorrow, meaning that action on the text would not take place before Thursday. In addition, according to a Western diplomat, there appears to be a possibility that another country could introduce a separate resolution on Iran.
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said the formal talks are going “very well.” Speaking to reporters after this morning’s session, ElBaradei said there are “a number of very important issues that need to be resolved.”
Washington has all but dropped a bid to have the board find Iran in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and send the matter to the U.N. Security Council. Garuckis said the decision not to seek a finding of noncompliance was a “pragmatic” one.
Representing the Nonaligned Movement, which earlier this year prevented the matter from being referred to the council, a Malaysian statement today said the Iran question should “be resolved through constructive dialogue within the framework of the agency.”
According to a text provided by the U.S. delegation, U.S. envoy Kenneth Brill said at the closed meeting that the “facts already established would fully justify an immediate finding of noncompliance by Iran” with its IAEA safeguards agreement.
“We have taken note, however, of the desire of other member states to give Iran a last chance to stop its evasions, and have agreed today to join in the call on Iran to take ‘essential and urgent’ actions to demonstrate that it has done so. Passing a resolution on this issue that firmly backs the IAEA’s efforts is the least the board could credibly do to meet its responsibilities,” Brill said.
The process, Saleh told reporters after this morning’s session, will influence Iran’s decision about whether to sign the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would open up the country’s nuclear facilities to more intrusive IAEA monitoring. ElBaradei said this morning that he “would hope that Iran would be in a position to conclude that protocol as soon as possible.”
“It very well depends upon the outcome of the board,” Saleh said, adding that a “fair and balanced” text on its nuclear programs could speed up the Additional Protocol process.
“If things are totally against ... the statute and the just and the balanced stance of the agency ... we will have to think carefully to our cooperation,” he said.
He added, though, “We have gone beyond our obligations. It is as though we have already signed the Additional Protocol.”
Brill said ElBaradei’s recent report on Iran (see GSN, Sept. 4) and other IAEA findings show Iran has failed to heed to board’s June call for “open questions” to be resolved and for better cooperation with the IAEA (see GSN, June 19). The U.S. stance was largely shared by Canada, which said “the nature of Iran’s nuclear program” and the country’s “evasiveness ... only [make] sense in the context of nuclear weapons ambitions,” and the European Union, which said the IAEA report “confirms that reporting obligations under Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA were not met.”
Brill said that at an Aug. 29 meeting of countries including Iran, it became clear that “the report is in error in saying Iran agreed to provide the agency information about its foreign suppliers of centrifuge information.”
Saleh, citing Iran’s claim that “intermediaries” were involved and suggesting the transaction took place too long ago to be investigated now, confirmed that the IAEA report erred in indicating Iran would name its suppliers.
Brill also listed other concerns, including a discrepancy over when Iran began developing centrifuges to enrich uranium; contradictory Iranian statements about whether its centrifuge program has benefited from help from other countries, which Iran now says it has; Iran’s claim never to have introduced nuclear material into centrifuges before the IAEA took samples earlier this year, which contradicts IAEA inspectors’ view that Iran’s program could not have reached the level it has without tests using nuclear material; and Iranian design information on a heavy water facility that includes no mention of hot cells, even though they would be necessary to the facility’s stated purpose (see GSN, Sept. 5).
“There are today more open questions about Iran’s nuclear program than there were on June 6. The more the agency has looked underneath the surface of Iran’s program, the less the explanations offered have hung together in a plausible way,” Brill said (see GSN, June 9). He added that Iran’s “cooperation with the agency has at best been episodic and reluctant and has frequently featured delay, denial of access and misinformation.”
“We’re looking for a resolution that’s going to give the IAEA a strengthened hand,” said Garuckis. He said the board should tell Iran, “This is your last chance. ... Please don’t cross this line.”
During a parade today celebrating North Korea’s 55th anniversary, the beleaguered country’s army chief said Pyongyang would continue to develop nuclear weapons, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 8).
“The D.P.R.K. will continue to increase its nuclear deterrent force as a means for just self-defense in order to defend the sovereignty of the country as the United States has not yet shown its will to drop its hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K. despite the D.P.R.K.’s good faith and magnanimity,” said Kim Yong Chun, chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army.
The anniversary parade, however, did not feature any new missiles and North Korea did not test a nuclear weapon on its birthday, as some observors had feared (see related GSN story, today).
“There was no military technical hardware in the parade. Only uniformed military units marching in columns,” said Polish Ambassador to North Korea Wojciech Kaluza (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 9).
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, meanwhile, brought eight new ministers into to his 31-member cabinet last week, a relatively dramatic change in the usually rigid North Korean leadership.
“They are less ideological and more oriented toward improving the economy,” said a senior South Korean official. “We are seeing a rapid rise of the technocrats. These are pragmatic people,” the official added.
The last cabinet shakeup was in 1998, the Los Angeles Times reported.
Among the appointees was a new prime minister, Pak Pong Ju, a 64-year-old former chemical industries minister. Pak was part of a delegation that visited Seoul last year. Some observers, however, do not believe that the infusion of technology friendly ministers signals a move forward for North Korea.
“I’m not optimistic that these technocrats will be able to do much,” said Cho Myong Chol, a former economics professor at Kim Il Sung university in Pyongyang who defected to South Korea. “Kim Jong Il seems to think he can solve the problems of his country through technology and not through real change in the system,” Cho said (Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9).
After a Titan rocket derivative was used to launch a spy satellite in Florida yesterday, only one former Titan 2 ICBM remains in Lockheed Martin’s hands (see GSN, July 23).
The launch, slightly delayed by a fuel leak and bad weather, took place at about 12:30 p.m., according to Florida Today (Chris Kridler, Florida Today, Sept. 9).
In 1986, Lockheed Martin was given a contract to refurbish 14 Titan 2 ICBMs and make them ready for U.S. government space launch use, according to a company release (Lockheed Martin fact sheet).
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Canadian officials yesterday launched “Global Mercury,” a three-day exercise to test the international community’s ability to respond to a smallpox attack (see GSN, Aug. 13).
Health officials from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, Mexico and the European Commission are taking part in the exercise. Officials from the World Health Organization are acting as advisers during the exercise.
“The main objective of the exercise is to test whether we can effectively, efficiently, and rapidly share medical information among countries for a fictitious smallpox event,” said a statement from Health Canada (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 9).
By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Postal Service last month completed a 15-city test of a new anthrax detection system, an agency spokesman told Global Security Newswire today, describing the test as a “resounding success” (see GSN, July 24).
The system works by testing the air surrounding mail-handling equipment for anthrax spores, according to reports. If spores are detected, the system automatically sends an e-mail to designated officials who then will use fire alarms to alert workers. While the system can be expanded to test for other biological weapons agents than anthrax, there are currently no plans to do so, Postal Service spokesman Bob Anderson said.
The Postal Service now plans to begin a two-phase nationwide deployment of the system in early 2004, Anderson said, adding that full deployment is scheduled to be completed in 2005. The test found “minor tweaks” that still need to be performed on the system before it is ready for deployment, he said.
In July, the Baltimore Sun reported that the Postal Service had entered into a $175 million contract with Northrop Grumman to install the new detection system. Anderson refused today to provide cost information, however, saying that the Postal Service was still in negotiation with Northrop Grumman.
The U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases has awarded a $36 million grant to a small California company for developing a pill to treat victims of a smallpox terrorist attack, the New York Times reported today. Currently, there is no treatment for individuals suffering from smallpox, only a vaccine to prevent the virus from taking hold (see GSN, Aug. 13).
Chimerix, a nine-person company in San Diego, intends to use the funding to conduct animal and human testing necessary to receive regulatory approval for the drug. The drug, CMX-001, has so far only been tested in mice, and only using viruses similar to smallpox, according to Chimerix Chief Executive Officer George Painter. Early results, however, indicate the drug could be effective if administered within three days of smallpox exposure.
Animal testing is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2004, according to the company.
The new drug is not intended to replace the smallpox vaccine, according to Catherine Laughlin, chief of the NIAID virology branch. Chimerix is attempting to create a pill using the drug cidofovir, which is thought to be effective against smallpox but can only be administered intravenously (Andrew Pollack, New York Times, Sept. 9).
The U.S. pharmaceutical company Dynport Vaccine Co. announced last week that it had received an $11 million grant to develop a new and more effective botulinum vaccine (see GSN, June 3).
Under the grant, provided by the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Dynport will develop manufacturing processes for a vaccine within two years to be effective against five of the neurotoxins known to be produced by the botulinum bacterium. The company is set to develop processes for a vaccine effective against all seven kinds of toxins produced by the bacterium within five years.
“Botulinum neurotoxin is generally recognized as the deadliest naturally occurring substance known and has been identified as a potential bioweapon,” company President Terry Irgens said in a press release. “There is an urgent need for a safe, efficacious vaccine that will protect against all seven known serotypes of the neurotoxin,” he said (Dynport Vaccine release, Sept. 4).
The current botulinum vaccine is only effective against three toxins and only after infection, the Associated Press reported (David Dishneau, Associated Press, Sept. 9).
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Mohamed Neggaoui, on trial in Morocco on allegations of involvement in a series of bombings in May in Casablanca, testified yesterday that he had received and hidden chemical weapons in the country in the 1980s, according to Agence France-Presse (see GSN, June 27).
Neggaoui said he had been provided the weapons by the Islamist Mujahedeen movement in Morocco, AFP reported. He told the court that “there was no democracy nor human rights” in Morocco at that time and that “the arms could be useful in the event of a civil war” (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 9).
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A reported new North Korean long-range ballistic missile was not displayed in a military parade yesterday in Pyongyang held to mark the country’s 55th birthday, Channel NewsAsia reported today (see GSN, Sept. 9).
South Korean defense analysts had expected North Korea to unveil the new missile during yesterday’s parade, rather than test launch it, which could have further destabilized U.S.-North Korean relations, according to Channel News Asia. A Western diplomat in Pyongyang, however, said there were no new missiles displayed in the parade.
“No new missiles, only soldiers, no (military) hardware,” the diplomat said. “It was a pretty normal, run-of-the-mill parade as far as I could see. Nothing special,” the diplomat added (Channel NewsAsia, Sept. 9).
Meanwhile, a Russian defense expert today dismissed reports that North Korea had developed a new long-range missile, according to ITAR-Tass.
“According to experience of the former Soviet Union and the United States, the creation of a missile of this kind must be preceded by a considerable cycle of flying tests,” said Vladimir Dvorkin, a senior adviser at the Russian Center of Political Studies. “It should be taken into account that nearly half of the first 10 launches end in accidents, which are perfectly recorded by space means,” he said (Anatoly Yurkin, ITAR-Tass, Sept. 9).
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To advance its boost-phase missile defense efforts, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency intends to pick the winning design for its kinetic energy interceptor by the end of this year, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported this week (see GSN, Aug. 21).
Boeing and Lockheed Martin have joined forces to compete for the contract and are facing off against a joint Northrop Grumman and Raytheon team.
Simultaneously, agency officials have decided to slow the pace of the interceptor’s development by about two years to allow the technology to mature, according to Jane’s. Once the winning team is selected, it will be asked to provide a prototype, with some operational capability, by 2011.
Program officials said that depending on an enemy missile’s range, its boost phase can last for 180 to 300 seconds. To reach the missile in this time, the interceptor will need to be “big,” according to Terry Little, the agency’s KEI program director.
It will probably be “much more like a small (ICBM) than a traditional surface-to-air missile,” he added (Michael Sirak, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Sept. 10).
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By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — Congressional auditors have found that poor accounting of sealed radioactive sources, which could be used by terrorists to produce a “dirty bomb,” has led to an inadequate understanding of precisely how many such sources are in use, according to an August U.S. General Accounting Office released today.
In addition to poor accounting practices, the GAO also found that there are weaknesses in both federal and state controls of the security of sealed radioactive sources, as well as in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s licensing process to obtain such sources, according to the report. The study is the third commissioned by Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii) to examine U.S. controls over the security of sealed radioactive sources. The two previous reports examined U.S. Energy Department efforts to control radioactive sources containing material that cannot be disposed of at commercial facilities (see GSN, May 14) and department efforts to help other countries secure radioactive sources (see GSN, June 17).
While the NRC has estimated that there about 2 million sealed sources in the United States, the precise number is unknown because the commission and individual states only track the number of licenses issued and not the number of sources themselves, according to the report. It adds that users of some devices that contain sealed sources, known as “general license” devices, do not have to apply for a license from the NRC, making it more difficult to account for such devices. The report recommends that the NRC determine whether the owners of generally licensed devices should be required to obtain licenses and if such a move would be cost-effective commensurate with the level of risk posed by the diversion of such devices.
According to the report, since 1998 there have been more than 1,300 reports of lost, stolen or abandoned devices containing sealed sources, with a majority subsequently recovered. While the NRC and Energy Department are working to categorize sealed sources by their level of risk, the agencies’ efforts are limited because they do not include an analysis of sealed sources in “agreement states” — 32 states that have obtained the authority to regulate the use of sealed sources within their borders — that regulate about 80 percent of U.S. radioactive materials licensees, the report says. The NRC lacks information on state-issued licenses due to a lack of access to individual state databases and a lack of information sharing between states, it says.
Poor Security
Besides poor accounting of sealed sources, the GAO found weaknesses in U.S. and state security controls. Visits by congressional investigators to licensees in 10 states found varying levels of security ranging from extensive security measures at a medical device manufacturer to a medical use licensee that kept its sealed sources in “an unlocked, unguarded space with the door propped open,” the report says.
In addition, the report says, the NRC licensing process to obtain sealed sources assumes an applicant is “acting in good faith” and allows them to acquire a source as soon as a license is issued by mail. It can then take up to a year before the commission conducts its first inspection of the licensee, “leaving the possibility that materials will be obtained and used maliciously in the meantime,” it warns, adding that the NRC should modify its licensing procedure to ensure that sealed sources cannot be purchased before their intended use can be verified.
In a press statement released today, Akaka criticized the lack of security controls and the apparent “loophole” in the NRC’s licensing process.
“The extent of the lack of tracking and security of sealed sources in this country is alarming. Almost one radioactive source a day is lost in the U.S. and it seems anybody can get a license to purchase radioactive sources without a background check,” Akaka said. “Tighter controls are needed, but the NRC and the agreement states are moving too slowly to improve tracking and security of sources in this country,” he said.
The GAO also found that the NRC and some states disagree over the role of states in regulating sealed source security, according to the report. While the NRC has the legal authority to order licensees, including those whose licenses were issued by states, to implement additional security measures, more than 80 percent of agreement states surveyed wanted to have responsibility for the inspection and enforcement of security measures, the report says. It adds that while the NRC has argued that agreement states lack the resources to secure sealed sources, about 75 percent of those states surveyed reported that they could “effectively respond” to a radiological incident with current resources.
Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the NRC and states have notified licensees of the need to improve security, but have not until recently began to issue legally binding orders to do so, the report says. For example, in early June the NRC issued orders to improve security at large irradiator facilities. The report says that NRC officials said a draft version did not fully present the current efforts of the commission to improve security or the work conducted over the past year-and-a-half, according to the report. The report adds, however, that agreement states agreed with GAO recommendations.
Akaka today suggested that congressional action might be necessary to improve NRC-state cooperation. “Congress may need to act to change the Atomic Energy Act to ensure coordination between the NRC and the states,” he said.
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2002 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.

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